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Health Care Law
Network Adequacy: The Regulation of
HMOs' Network of Health Care Providers
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last 15 years, purchasers of health care services have developed a
variety of strategies to combat rapidly rising health care costs.' Collectively,
these strategies have come to be called "managed care."2 Perhaps the single
most important and widely used managed care technique is to restrict patients to
a limited network of health care providers,' thereby gaining for the benefit of the
purchaser the ability to negotiate discounts from providers, as well as the ability
to monitor outcomes and to impose practice guidelines on health care providers
more effectively.4
"Managed care plans operate by regulating the consumption of health care
resources, with the clear intent of lowering consumption."5 One method of
reducing consumption of health care is through the use of restricted networks of
health care providers.6 Because use of such networks has become "pervasive,"7
the ability of a health insurance carrier to deliver the services promised to its
customers through the limited network of health care providers has become "the
subject of intense public and private debate."8
In June 1996, that debate in Missouri led to the establishment of the Joint
Interim Committee on Managed Care, with Senator Joe Maxwell from Mexico,
Missouri, and Representative Tim Harlan from Columbia, Missouri, as co-chairs
of the committee.9 The Committee, made up of five House members and five
Senate members,'0 held several hearings, and took testimony from more than 175
citizens." The purpose of these efforts was to find ways to "improve the quality
1. Bradford H. Gray, Trust and Trustworthy Care in the Managed Care Era,
HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 34, 36-37.
2. Gray, supra note 1, at 37.
3. Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance ofManaged Care: Insurance Trends
in the 1990s, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 125, 125.
4. Gray, supra note 1, at 37.
5. Donald W. Moran, Federal Regulation of Managed Care: An Impulse in Search
of a Theory?, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 7, 13.
6. Gray, supra note 1, at 37.
7. Moran, supra note 5, at 13.
8. Moran, supra note 5, at 13.
9. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MISSOURI GEN. ASSEMBLY, FINAL REPORT OF THE
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of health care for Missouri citizens, while preserving the considerable cost
savings achieved by managed care.'
12
The Committee's first two categories of recommendations to the General
Assembly each involved the ability of enrollees in a Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO) to have adequate access to health care providers. 3
Specifically, the first of these recommendations was that the General Assembly
adopt "network adequacy" criteria to ensure that "citizens should not have to
drive long distances for care, especially if care is available in their local
communities." The criteria were to be based on the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) model legislation. 4
This and many other recommendations of the Joint Interim Committee on
Managed Care were signed into law in June 1997, when Governor Carnahan
signed Senate Substitute for Senate Committee Substitute for House Substitute
for House Committee Substitute for House Bill 335 (HB 335)." HB 335 makes
a variety of sweeping changes in how managed care is to be delivered in the
state.'6 Whereas the network adequacy provisions of the legislation will affect
all enrollees in HMOs and Point of Service (POS) Plans, 7 most provisions of the
legislation will affect a much smaller number of people: those who access health
care services more frequently. 8 The network adequacy provisions of iB 335,
therefore, have the potential to have a greater impact on the state's health
delivery system than any of the other provisions enacted in the legislation.
In light of the potential impact of the network adequacy provisions of NB
335, the manner in which such provisions are implemented will play a
significant role in how the state's health care delivery system will look in the
12. Id. at 2.
13. Id. at 1-2.
14. Id. at 1.
15. Scott Charton, Managed Care Law Aimed at 'Abuses, ST. Louis POST
DISPATCH, June 26, 1997, at Al.
16. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.609 (Supp. 1997), pertaining to contract
termination between HMOs and health care providers; Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.615 (Supp.
1997), requiring standing referrals to specialists for patients diagnosed with a life-
threatening illness, or degenerative disease; Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.618 (Supp. 1997),
requiring that HMOs offer an "open referral plan" under certain circumstances; Mo. REV.
STAT. § 376.1361 (Supp. 1997), requiring, among other things, that utilization review
programs be "based on sound clinical evidence," that decisions be reviewed by a licensed
clinical peer, and be completed in a timely manner; Mo. REV. STAT. § 376.1367 (Supp.
1997), adopting a "prudent layperson" standard for emergency services; Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 376.1387 (Supp. 1997), providing for the independent review by the Director of the
Department of Insurance and independent medical panels with which the director
contracts for the resolution of disputes between health carriers and patients.
17. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.603 (Supp. 1997).
18. Walter A. Zelman, Consumer Protection in Managed Care: Finding the
Balance, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 158, 161.
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future. This Law Summary will examine how HB 335 has changed the manner
in which the state may regulate HMOs' health care provider networks, and make
recommendations concerning how that new authority should be utilized.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In 1983, the General Assembly passed HB 127 which, for the first time,
addressed the state regulation of HMOs separately from that of traditional
insurance companies. 9 The General Assembly required that any HMO doing
business in the state at that time apply to the Director of the Division of
Insurance for a Certificate of Authority to do business in Missouri.2" In order to
grant such a certificate, the Director of the Division of Insurance had to be
satisfied that, among other things, "the health maintenance organization will
effectively provide or arrange for the provision of basic health care services on
a prepaid basis . . . except to the extent of reasonable requirements for
copayments."' The term "[b]asic health care services" was defined as "services
which an enrolled population might reasonably require in order to be maintained
in good health."' The requirement that the HMO be able to effectively provide
"basic health care services" was the only language in the statute upon which the
Division of Insurance could rely to compel an HMO to maintain an adequate
network of health care providers.'
In order to implement HB 127, the Division of Insurance promulgated rules
affecting HMOs.24 Under Missouri administrative law principles, the Division
of Insurance could not impose upon a regulated entity "a statement of general
applicability which should have been promulgated as a rule. '2s A rule includes
"each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets, or
prescribes law or policy, or that describes the organization, procedure or practice
requirements of any agency." Therefore, any general standards used to evaluate
M the adequacy of an HMO's network used by the Department of Insurance
(DOI) would have to be promulgated as a rule.26
Although the Division of Insurance had authority to promulgate "reasonable
rules ... as are necessary or proper to carry out the provisions of sections
354.400 to 354.550,"27 the only rule which even arguably addressed network
19. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.400 (1994).
20. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.405.2 (1994). The Division of Insurance became a
department due to a constitutional amendment, adopted August 7, 1990. MO. CONST. art
IV, § 36(b).
21. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.410.1(2) (1984).
22. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.400.1 (1984).
23. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 354.400-354.550 (1984).
24. See MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20, § 400 (1993).
25. Mo. REV. STAT. § 536.021.1(8) (1994).
26. NME Hosps., Inc. v. Div. of Med. Servs., 850 S.W.2d 71, 74 (Mo. 1993).
27. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.485 (1984).
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adequacy failed to set standards for evaluating whether an HMO had an adequate
network of health care providers.2 The rule, entitled "Service Area Expansion,"
merely required that HMOs wishing to expand their service area provide the
Division of Insurance with a list of health care providers under contract with the
HMO to provide health care services.' Therefore, prior to the enactment of HB
335, the requirement that HMOs provide the broadly defined "basic health care
services" was the only regulatory constraint on an HMO offering to an enrollee
a possible inadequate network of health care providers.3" The result was that the
Division (and later, Department) had limited ability to enforce network adequacy
standards on HMOs.3' In fact, Department of Insurance personnel relied on
market forces to address the adequacy of HMOs' networks, at least where
competition existed.32
The Joint Interim Committee on Managed Care recommended that the
General Assembly adopt network adequacy standards based on the NAIC
Managed Care Plan Network Adequacy Model Act (Model Act).33 The purpose
of the Model Act was "to establish standards for the creation and maintenance
of networks by [HMOs] and to assure the adequacy, accessibility and quality of
health care services offered under a managed care plan., 34 According to
Josephine Musser, NAIC president and commissioner of insurance in Wisconsin,
the Managed Care Plan Network Adequacy Model Act is one of several model
acts "targeted toward addressing issues that consumers consider to be
problems."'35
The NAIC Model Act applies to "health carriers,"36 which are defined to
include "any... entity providing a plan of health insurance, health benefits or
28. Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20 § 400-7.090 (1993).
29. MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 20 § 400-7.090 (1993).
30. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.410.1 (Supp. 1997).
31. See, e.g., Letters from Jim Casey, Supervisor, Department of Insurance Life &
Health Section, to United HealthCare of the Midwest, Inc. (Dec. 4, 1996) and to
Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. (June 27, 1997) (on file with author); Memorandum
from Jim Casey, Supervisor, Department of Insurance Life & Health Section, to Tom
Bixby, Department of Insurance Director of the Division of Consumer Affairs, and
Wendy Taparanskas, Department of Insurance Health Care Specialist (Dec. 23, 1997)
(on file with author).
32. Id.
33. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MIssouRi GEN. ASSEMBLY, FINAL REPORT OF THE
JOINT INTERIM COMMITrEE ON MANAGED CARE 1 (Nov. 1996).
34. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 2 (National Ass'n
of Ins. Commr's 1996).
35. John K. Iglehart, State Regulation of Managed Care: NAIC President
Josephine Musser, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS 36, 38 (1997).
36. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORKADEQUACY MODEL Acr § 4 (National Ass'n
of Ins. Commr's 1996).
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health services." '37 Under the Model Act, health carriers are required to
"maintain a network that is sufficient in numbers and types of providers to assure
that all services to covered persons will be accessible without unreasonable
delay."38 The adequacy of a network is to be "established by reference to any
reasonable criteria used by the [health] carrier" '39 in an "access plan" filed with
the state insurance commissioner.'
The "reasonable criteria" are to include factors such as physician to patient
ratios, geographic accessibility, waiting times for appointments, and hours of
health care providers' operation.4' The health carrier must ensure that if it does
not have under contract the type of provider needed to meet its customers' needs,
then any person needing such services may obtain them at no greater cost than
if the provider were in the carrier's network.42 The plan must "establish and
maintain adequate arrangements to ensure reasonable proximity of participating
providers... [while giving] due consideration to the relative availability of
health care providers in the service area under consideration." 3 Furthermore, the
access plan must include a description of the health carrier's network," and a
"process for monitoring and assuring on an ongoing basis the sufficiency of the
network to meet the health care needs of populations that enroll in managed care
plans. 4 5
The Model Act contemplates that each health carrier establish its own
independent "reasonable criteria" in the development of a plan46 and that the
plan be submitted to (or otherwise be available to) the state's insurance
37. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 3. Under ERISA,
the state's jurisdiction would not extend to self-insured plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-1461
(1994). In 1995, 46% of people with health insurance through their employers were
covered by ERISA qualified self-insured plans, so surprisingly few people are affected
by state insurance regulation. Jensen, supra note 3, at 128.
38. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 5A (Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Commr's 1996).
39. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 5A (Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Comm'rs 1996).
40. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 5B (Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Comnir's 1996).
41. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 5A (Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Commr's 1996).
42. MANAGED CAREPLANNETWORKADEQUACYMODELACT § 5A(l) (Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Commr's 1996).
43. MANAGED CAREPLANNETWORKADEQUACYMODELACT § 5A(2) (Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Comnir's 1996).
44. MANAGED CARE PLANNETWORKADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 5B(1) (Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Commr's 1996).
45. MANAGED CAREPLANNETWORKADEQUACY MODELACT § 5B(3) (Nat'l Ass'n
Ins. Commr's 1996).
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commissioner.47 Some states would give the commissioner approval authority
over the plan,4" but all states adopting the Model Act would allow the
commissioner to "institute a corrective action" in the event that the "health
carrier has not contracted with enough participating providers to assure that
covered persons have accessible health care services in a geographic area, or that
a health carrier's access plan does not assure reasonable access to covered
benefits."49 Although the commissioner is given wide latitude in determining
whether a violation has taken place,50 it is the responsibility of each health carrier
to establish the specific criteria by which its own network should be evaluated
for adequacy under the Model Act.
5
'
One of the purposes of the Model Act is to assure that enrollees receive
high-quality health care from managed care plans.5 ' However, the regulatory
structure of the managed care industry (indeed, the health insurance industry as
a whole) creates "perverse incentives" to "avoid enrolling potentially high cost
patients and ... to displease high-cost patients among existing enrollees."
53
Generally speaking, health insurers-including managed care companies-are
free to weed out or isolate high-risk patients or groups 4.5 Although competition
for healthy patients may be fierce, the ability to avoid high-risk patients is key
to an insurer's ability to keep costs down."
The "perverse incentive" to weed out high-risk patients can be focused to
an extraordinary degree: one percent of patients account for thirty percent of
health care costs, and five percent account for sixty percent of costs.56 The result
is that the health insurance industry's "perverse incentive" encourages HMOs to
47. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 5B (Nat'l Ass'n
Ins. Commr's 1996). See also the drafting note for Section 5B.
48. MANAGED CAREPLANNETWORKADEQUACYMODELACT § 5B(Nat'l Ass'n Ins.
Commr's 1996). See also the draffing note for Section 5B.
49. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 10 (Nat'l Ass'n
Ins. Commr's 1996).
50. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 10 (Nat'l Ass'n
Ins. Commr's 1996).
51. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 5A (Nat'l Ass'n
Ins. Commr's 1996).
52. Iglehart, supra note 35, at 38.
53. Iglehart, supra note 35, at 38.
54. There are few requirements that insurers provide health coverage to those they
would rather not cover, and those few requirements invariably allow insurers to set rates
based on concentrating the high-risk patients into high-risk rating pools. For example,
although the Small Employer Health Insurance Availability Act requires that insurers sell
policies to small employers, it allows those employers to be concentrated into isolated
pools. MO. REV. STAT. § 379.400-379.415 (1994).
55. U.S. Gov'r GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE REFORM:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR RISK ADJUSTMENT UNDER COMMUNITY RATING 4 (Sept. 1994).
56. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
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focus marketing efforts on the healthy, and to (at best) ignore the unhealthy."
This marketing focus is reflected-whether through intentional action or not-in
data collection and quality evaluation techniques." Health plans typically
evaluate quality of care based on "primary care and preventive services [rather]
than on care of patients with significant health care problems."5 9 Data useful for
assessing the quality of care provided to those patients with serious illnesses is
not "routinely available."60 Although such data is not available in part because
of the complexity and expense necessary to make such data meaningful,6' the
fact that it is not collected makes it difficult for those with serious illnesses to
make informed decisions based on the quality of care provided by an HMO. 62
Quality of care data available to enrollees typically focuses on quality of care for
those individuals who are most healthy.63
The result of this "perverse incentive" also is reflected in consumer
satisfaction surveys: the better an enrollee's self-reported health, the higher his
or her satisfaction with the HMO4  Obviously, the converse is also true: the
lower an enrollee's self-reported health, the lower his or her satisfaction with the
IMO.6' This statistical relationship is "quite strong" 66 and is the only variable,
other than ability to choose between plans, to have a significant impact on the
extent of a member's satisfaction with an HMO. 67
Insum, the regulatory structure of the health insurance industry produces
a powerful incentive to encourage the enrollment of healthy patients, and
discourage the enrollment of unhealthy patients. 6' HMOs, employers, and
enrollees have yet to overcome this incentive in addressing quality of care
issues.69
57. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
58. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
59. Gray, supra note 1, at 45. HEDIS (Health Plan Employer Data and Information
Set), the most widely used industry standard for data collection, has "itself acknowledged
[these] shortcomings." Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
60. Elizabeth A. McGlynn, Six Challenges in Measuring the Quality of Health
Care, 16 HEALTH AFFAmS 7, 19 (1997).
6 1. McGlynn, supra note 60, at 19.
62. McGlynn, supra note 60, at 19.
63. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
64. Ralph Ullman, et al., Satisfaction and Choice: A View from the Plans, 16
HEALTH AFFAIRS 209, 213 (1997).
65. Ullman, supra note 64, at 213.
66. Ullman, supra note 64, at 213.
67. Ullman, supra note 64, at 213.
68. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
69. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
1998]
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A. Factors Leading to the Passage of HB 335
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, health care costs increased dramatically,
leading many to describe the problem as a "crisis."7 Managed care is generally
credited with playing a significant role in getting health care costs under control7'
and has been able to do so because "[t]he use of managed care has skyrocketed
since 1993. "72 Missouri's experience has been similar to that of the rest of the
nation: although HMO membership growth remained fairly slow between 1987
and 1991, growing from 413,017 ' to just over one-half million enrollees in 1991
(an average growth of five percent per year),74 by the end of 1996, the number
of people in the state covered by HMOs had increased to more than 1.3 million
enrollees (an average growth rate of more than twenty-one percent per year).7"
This growth in membership was particularly rapid in public sector health
programs. Medicaid and Medicare enrollment increased from no enrollees in
1992,76 to more than one-quarter million in 1996. 7 Furthermore, the University
of Missouri and the Missouri Consolidated Health Care Plan78 (providing health
care coverage to most state employees) both moved to HMO plans in 1994 and
1995. This large new market provided the incentive for HMOs to move to
central Missouri, which went from having one HMO in 19927" to fourteen in
1996.80 The result was that in a very short period of time, many enrollees were
69. Alain C. Enthoven & Sara J. Singer, Markets and Collective Action in
Regulating Managed Care, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS 26, 27 (1997).
71. Enthoven & Singer, supra note 70, at 27.
72. Jensen, supra note 3, at 126.
73. STATISTICS SECTION, DIvIsION OF INSURANCE, MISSOURI DEP'T OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, MISSOURI HEALTHM INENANCE ORGANIZATION REPORT, COMPILED FOR
YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1987 (1988).
74. STATISTICS SECTION, MISSOURI DEP'T OF INSURANCE, MISSOURI HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION REPORT 15 (1995).
75. STATISTICS SECTION, MISSOURI DEP'T OF INSURANCE, MISSOURI HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION REPORT 15 (1997).
76. STATISTICS SECTION, MISSOURI DEP'T OF INSURANCE, MISSOURI HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION REPORT 15 (1997).
77. STATISTICS SECTION, MISSOURI DEP'T OF INSURANCE, MISSOURI HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION REPORT 15 (1997).
78. Managed Competition to Save State $110 to $150 Million over Five Years,
MISSOURI CONSOLIDATED HEALTH CARE PLAN MEDIA RELEASE 2 (Sept. 27, 1994).
79. STATISTICS SECTION, MISSOURI DEP'T OF INSURANCE MISSOURI HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION REPORT (1992). Only one of the plans reported in the
document covers counties in central Missouri.
80. STATISTICS SECTION, MISSOURI DEP'T OF INSURANCE, MISSOURI HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION REPORT 1996, at 6 (1997).
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exposed to HMO coverage for the first time, and many health care providers
began contracting with HMOs for the first time."
The exposure to utilization review, new payment methods, practice
monitoring and practice guidelines associated with managed care,82 as well as the
discounts negotiated by managed care plans, have led many health care providers
to protest their loss of autonomy and power. 3 "Managed care shifts much
control over the flow of dollars and patients from physicians to [HMOs] that
have strong economic goals and the power to influence patient care in the pursuit
of those goals. This combination of purpose and power" has led to dissention
among HMOs, providers, and the groups representing those providers." These
provider groups typically have "far more political clout than a coalition of 'out-
of-town gunslinger' HMO companies,"85 and they brought that clout to bear in
support of iB 335.86
Similarly, consumer concerns with managed care include the "reduction in
choice of physicians that is inherent in most managed care plans."" The result
of the concerns of health care providers in conjunction with concerns of health
care consumers has been "an unprecedented assault, driven by charges and fears
that the rush to lower costs will reduce access to care, quality of care, choice of
providers, and basic consumer protections." 8  The "assault" has been
sufficiently effective to gain the attention of the National Governors'
Association, which recently held a conference devoted solely to the regulation
of managed care, 9 President Clinton, whose Advisory Commission on
Consumer Protection and Quality in the Health Care Industry developed a
81. STATISTICS SECTION, MISSOURI DEP'T OF INSURANCE, MISSOURI HEALTH
MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION REPORT 1996, at 6 (1997).
82. Gray, supra note 1, at 37.
83. Gray, supra note 1, at 37.
84. Gray, supra note 1, at 37.
85. Moran, supra note 5, at 9.
86. E.g., the Missouri State Chiropractors Association, the Missouri Association
of Osteopathic Physicians and Surgeons, the Missouri Society of the American College
of Osteopathic Family Physicians, the Missouri State Medical Society, the Missouri
Dental Association, the Metropolitan Medical Society of Greater Kansas City, the
Missouri State Board of Registration for the Healing Arts, and the Missouri Pharmacy
Association, to name a few, each supported HB 335 (written statements and testimony
on file with the author).
87. Zelman, supra note 18, at 159.
88. Zelman, supra note 18, at 158.
89. Some States Already Enforcing Rights for Consumers Enrolled in Managed
Care, 5 HEALTH CARE POLICY REPORT 1 (1997).
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managed care Consumer Bill of Rights," Congress,' and many state
legislatures.92 In Missouri, the "assault" led to the passage of HB 335.
B. NetworkAdequacy in HB 335
Reflecting the concerns of consumers and health care providers, the General
Assembly made an adequate network of health care providers one of its chief
concerns when passing HB 335.93 The legislation requires that an HMO
"provide its enrollees with adequate access to health care providers." The bill
inserted this provision in the list of requirements for issuance of a certificate of
authority to do business in the state.94 Similar language95 requires that an HMO
show that it has a sufficient number of providers in its application for a
certificate of authority.96
Substantially more detailed language was adapted from the NAIC Model
Act, with a few significant modifications.97 First, whereas the Model Act states
that the adequacy of the network may "be established by reference to any
reasonable criteria used by the [health] carrier,"98 HB 335 states that the
adequacy of the network "shall be determined by the director [ofthe Department
oflnsurance] ... and by reference to any reasonable criteria."99 Second, where
the Model Act grants the commissioner rulemaking authority,' HB 335 does
not contain an additional grant of rulemaking authority for purposes of HMO-
related provisions."' Finally, the legislation requires an HMO to "make its
90. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND QUALITY IN THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY, Consumer Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, Report to the
President of the United States (Nov. 1997).
91. See, e.g, HR 1415, 105th Session of Congress, 1st Session, sponsored by
Representative Norwood et al.
92. Zelman, supra note 18, at 158.
93. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE MISSOURI GEN. ASSEMBLY, FINAL REPORT OF THE
JOINT INTERIM COMMITTEE ON MANAGED CARE 1 (Nov. 1996).
94. MO. REV. STAT. § 354.410.1 (Supp. 1997).
95. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.405.3(13) (Supp. 1997) ("Evidence demonstrating that
the health maintenance organization has provided its enrollees with adequate access to
health care providers ...").
96. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.405.3 (Supp. 1997).
97. MO. REV. STAT. § 354.603.1 (Supp. 1997).
98. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL AcT § 5A (Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Commr's 1996) (emphasis added).
99. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.603.1 (Supp. 1997) (emphasis added).
100. MANAGED CARE PLAN NETWORK ADEQUACY MODEL ACT § 11 (Nat'l Ass'n
of Ins. Commr's 1996).
101. See MO. REV. STAT. § 354.600-354.636 (Supp. 1997).
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entire network available to all enrollees unless a contract holder has agreed in
writing to a different or reduced network."'02
In order for the Department of Insurance to enforce network adequacy
standards consistently and fairly, it must be able to use "a statement of general
applicability that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy"' 3 and must,
therefore, promulgate rules to define its policy."° No new rulemaking authority
was granted the Department of Insurance specific to the network adequacy
provisions of HB 335.1'5 However, HB 335 requires that an HMO be "able to
provide its enrollees with adequate access to health care providers" as a
condition of licensure.'" Because the Department of Insurance has rulemaking
authority over licensure provisions,0 7 it should be able to promulgate rules
defining an adequate network and require that such a network be a condition of
licensure.
HB 335 was a legislative response to a consumer and health care provider
"assault" on managed care. Although much of the bill, and the network
adequacy provisions in particular are based on NAIC Model Acts, the General
Assembly determined that the Department of Insurance, rather than each
individual HMO, was the appropriate entity to determine what constitutes an
adequate network. Because the General Assembly required that HMOs give
enrollees "adequate access to health care providers,"'0 8 the Department of
Insurance has broad authority in regard to network adequacy.
IV. DISCUSSION
HMOs object to regulation of networks on the grounds that rigid
requirements designed by government will lead to "cookie cutter" health care
plans and stifle the creativity of the market.'09 However, the fact that the
legislature determined that the Department of Insurance should establish the
adequacy of an HMO's network rather than a health carrier 1' clearly suggests
that the legislature had limited faith that the marketplace could address the issue.
102. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.603.1(4) (Supp. 1997).
103. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.010 (4) (1994).
104. Mo. REv. STAT. § 536.021.1(8) (1994).
105. See Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 354.600-354.636 (Supp. 1997).
106. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.410.1(10) (Supp. 1997).
107. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.485 (1994) gives the director of the Department of
Insurance rulemaking authority for Missouri Revised Statute Sections 354.400 to
354.550 (1994), and the licensure requirements pertaining to network adequacy are in
Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.410.1(10) (Supp. 1997).
.108. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.410.1(10) (Supp. 1997).
109. Letter from Michael G. Winter, Executive Director of the Missouri
Association of Health Plans, to Tom Bixby, Director of the Division of Consumer
Affairs, Department of Insurance (Jan. 8, 1998) (on file with author).
110. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.603.1 (Supp. 1997).
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The question then becomes under what circumstances the Department of
Insurance should rely on regulation, as opposed to relying on the marketplace,
to protect consumers from inadequate networks of health care providers.
Network adequacy is, in part, a quality of care issue. Although large
employers have begun to consider quality issues in the marketing of health care
coverage,"' "[flew purchasers have ever terminated an HMO contract because
the quality of the plan's care ... was poor.""' In addition, quality issues have
failed to approach the significance of price as a factor in purchasing. "3 Smaller
employers are less likely to be involved in addressing quality issues than larger
employers.' Smaller employers are also more likely to be covered by state-
regulated plans than large employers,"5 and smaller employers are increasingly
moving to managed care products." 6 For purposes of state-regulated managed
care plans, therefore, quality of care does not seem to be adequately addressed
by market forces.
Market forces probably have some impact on the number of providers in an
HMO's network: one factor positively affecting consumers' choice of HMOs is
a broad network of health care providers." 7 But, to the extent employer groups
have attempted to get HMOs to address these issues, the results have focused on
primary care and preventive services" 8 rather than the needs of the least healthy.
As noted above, HMOs have the "perverse incentive" to "displease high-cost
enrollees"'" 9 and, at the same time, they have the incentive to encourage healthy
people to become members. 20 HMOs, therefore, have very strong financial
incentives to offer a less than adequate network of specialty care
providers-who provide care to high-cost enrollees, and have at least a moderate
market incentive to develop a broad primary care provider network, which
would provide services predominately to healthy patients. Although market
forces are arguably beginning to address network adequacy issues, then, the
needs of the least healthy are not being addressed. As a result, whereas market
creativity may be able to address consumers' desire to have a large network of
primary care providers, it is unlikely to address the needs of the five percent of
HMO enrollees who are responsible for sixty percent of the costs.'
111. Gray, supra note 1, at 44.
112. Michael H. Bailit, Ominous Signs and Portents: A Purchaser's View of Health
Care Market Trends, 16 HEALTH AFFAIRS 85, 86 (1997).
113. Id.
114. Zelman, supra note 18, at 163.
115. Iglehart, supra note 35, at 39-40.
116. Jensen, supra note 3, at 127.
117. Bailit, supra note 113, at 86.
118. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
119. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
120. U.S. GOV'T GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH CARE REFORM:
CONSIDERATIONS FOR RISK ADJUSTMENT UNDER COMMUNITY RATING 4 (Sept. 1994).
121. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
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Another aspect of network adequacy for which market forces are unlikely
to satisfactorily address the needs of enrollees is in physician shortage areas."
These areas have too few health care providers to serve the needs of the
population.I" These areas are also less likely to have large employers who
purchase health coverage based, at least in part, on quality of care. 24 As a result,
the marketplace is not likely to address the network adequacy needs of
individuals living in physician shortage areas.
V. CONCLUSION
Although managed care has effectively brought the cost of health care
under control," many of the strategies employed to do so have come under
fire.'" As a result of consumer and provider concerns about managed care,27 the
Missouri General Assembly passed and Governor Carnahan signed HB 335,
which provided for extensive reforms in how managed care will operate in the
state.Iu Included among these reforms is the requirement that HMOs "provide
its enrollees with adequate access to health care providers.' 29 In HB 335, the
General Assembly gave the Director of the Department of Insurance the
responsibility for determining what constitutes an adequate network of
providers.
131
Although discussion of the quality of health care provided by HMOs has
begun to take place in the marketing of health care coverage,13 such discussions
take place primarily among large employers not affected by state regulation,
3 2
and rarely affect purchasing decisions. 33 Health insurers, including IMOs, have
the incentive to encourage healthy customers to enroll in their network,' and
to discourage unhealthy customers from Department of Insuranceng so."'
122. Physician shortage areas are geographic regions designated by the Health Care
Financing Administration. The agency identifies areas in the country which have an
insufficient supply of health care providers to meet the needs of the population. In
Missouri, physician shortage areas are primarily rural areas, although inner-city Kansas
City and St. Louis are also so designated.
123. Id.
124. Zelman, supra note 18, at 163.
125. Enthoven, supra note 70, at 27.
126. Gray, supra note 1, at 37.
127. Moran, supra note 5, at 13. See also supra note 78.
128. See supra note 16.
129. Mo. REV. STAT. § 354.410.1(10) (Supp. 1997).
130. Mo. REv. STAT. § 354.603.1 (Supp. 1997).
131. Gray, supra note 1, at 44.
132. Iglehart, supra note 35, at 39-40.
133. Bailit, supra note 113, at 86.
134. U.S. Government Accounting Office, supra note 121, at 4.
135. Gray, supra note 1, at 45.
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The greatest need for regulation of network adequacy is in the area of care
provided to the least healthy of a plan's enrollees and to those living in physician
shortage areas. The Department of Insurance should develop network adequacy
standards which focus most heavily on specialized care for unhealthy enrollees,
and on ensuring adequate coverage for those in physician shortage areas. To the
extent possible, the rules should allow plans flexibility so as to enable market
forces to address quality issues. However, market forces are not effectively
addressing concerns about network adequacy for those individuals who are most
vulnerable in the health care system. Allowing HMOs the flexibility to address
those needs-without more-would seem to be abdication of the responsibility
given to the Department of Insurance by the General Assembly in HB 335.
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